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                          Abstract   
 
In a recent paper Terry Peach argues that Adam Smith found no reason to 
limit application of the labour-embodied theory of value to the case of the 
“early and rude state” of society. In fact, not only that: according to Peach, 
Smith found a problem in employing the labour-commanded measure of 
value with reference to the contemporary “commercial” economy and, in 
order to resolve the issue, he (somewhat surreptitiously) abandoned 
labour-commanded and adopted instead labour-embodied as a generally valid 
theory of exchange value. However, we find Peach’s revolutionary 
“Reconsideration” to be fatally flawed - for the reason that it derives from 
Peach’s evident misunderstanding of what is implied by the 
labour-commanded measure of value. 
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1. Introduction 
In his paper “Adam Smith and the Labour Theory of (Real) Value:  A Reconsideration” (2009) 
Terry Peach propounds the novel thesis that Adam Smith, despite accepting that the simple 
labour-embodied theory of value (the proposition that the value of a commodity equals the total 
value of the labour directly and indirectly employed in its production) applies only in the context 
of a society in which all income is received by labour without any share going as rent or profits, 
nevertheless did his best to present relative values as essentially determined by labour embodied 
even when profits and rents do enter into the picture. Peach’s intention is, as he puts it (p.383), “to 
establish [that] Smith continued to apply labour theory reasoning to the later ‘commercial’ 
society, both to static exchangeable values and their changes.” 
Is Peach correct? Did Smith really attempt to do that?  The purpose of this paper is to try to 
answer these questions. 
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We consider Peach's argument step by step. His discussion may be viewed as falling into three 
parts. He attempts firstly to make the point that, with reference to modern "commercial" society - 
even when taking account of profit and rent as constituents of commodity prices - Smith says 
nothing which actually excludes the possibility that labour costs still determine relative (if not 
absolute) commodity values. In the second part of his discussion Peach contends that Smith, 
notwithstanding his introduction of a labour-commanded measure of value, nevertheless harks 
back to the notion that commodity values correspond to quantities of labour-embodied. Peach in 
fact argues – most unexpectedly - that Smith's labour-commanded measure leads him, via its 
corn-commanded equivalent, to a labour-embodied standard. Thirdly, Peach seeks to demonstrate 
that in analysing particular real world situations Smith reveals adherence to the labour-embodied 
theory of value. 
2. A generally applicable - if "approximate" – version of the labour theory of value? 
Peach begins by stating (p.383) his intention “to question the widely-held opinion that Adam 
Smith confined his use of a labour theory of exchangeable value to an ‘early and rude’ state of 
society in which independent laborers exchange the surplus products of their labor.” In that 
notional (classless) “early state” commodity prices (costs) consist simply of the sum of payments 
to labour incurred in production. Peach's claim is that Smith saw no reason not to employ, and 
indeed continued to employ, a “labour-embodied” approach with reference to the situation 
existing in a contemporary society in which capitalists and landowners capture shares of the 
national product. 
Peach - as he himself recognises – is going against the grain of conventional opinion in suggesting 
that Smith saw the labour theory (or a version thereof) as being of general applicability and not 
limited to the “early and rude” state of society. That is certainly not how Smith is normally 
interpreted. The general opinion amongst scholars is that Smith did employ a labour theory of 
value, but merely as a preliminary analytical step, applicable only in the context of a notional, 
pre-modern economy. Peach emphasises that he is rejecting the conventional view, as espoused 
by such authorities as Joseph Schumpeter (1954), Sam Hollander (1973), Donald Winch (1978) 
and Nerio Naldi (2003). 
The view rejected by Smith is expressed, for instance, by Schumpeter (1954, pp.188-9) who, on 
the issue of what Peach calls "confinement of the labour theory,” comes down squarely in favour 
of the usual interpretation - that Smith confined applicability of the labour theory to the "early and 
rude” state of society. Thus Schumpeter: 
The quantity [of labour] a commodity costs to produce . . . comes to the front in the 
famous beaver-deer example at the beginning of ch. 6, though it is but just to add 
that Smith confines the proposition that this quantity “regulates” price expressly to 
that "early and rude state of society" in which there are no other distributive shares 
[other than wages] shares to take into account. 
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Schumpeter comments further: 
       We are left with the . . . labor-quantity theory of value. And, finally, since A. Smith - 
unlike Ricardo and Marx - claimed no validity at all for this concept except in a 
special case, we come to the conclusion that, in spite of his emphasis on the labor 
factor, his theory of value is no labor theory at all. (Emphasis added.) 
How does Peach come to so different an understanding of Smith? 
Note first that Peach (p.387) certainly accepts that Smith understood that when profits and rents 
emerge as income shares – as costs to be covered out of the proceeds from the sale of output - 
commodity prices cannot be comprised simply of wages paid to labour employed. He quotes Smith 
(Wealth of Nations, I, vi, 7) to the effect that, subsequent to the notional “early and rude state of 
society” capitalists come on to the scene and demand shares of the output produced: 
In this state of things, the whole of the produce of labour does not always belong to 
the labourer. He must in most cases share it with the owner of the stock which 
employs him. Neither is the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or 
producing any commodity, the only circumstance which can regulate the quantity 
which it ought commonly to purchase, command, or exchange for. An additional 
quantity, it is evident, must be due for the profits of the stock which advanced the 
wages and furnished the materials of that labour.                                 
Likewise, again quoting from the Wealth of Nations (I, vi, 8), Peach recognises Smith to 
understand that landowners also capture - as rent - a share of output:  
As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, 
like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for 
its natural produce. . . . [The labourer] must give up to the landlord a portion of what 
his labour either collects or produces. 
Thus Peach acknowledges Smith's appreciation of the fact that, under the conditions of a 
contemporary "commercial society", payment of profits and rents divorces the overall cost of 
production from the wage cost component. Nevertheless Peach doubts that that was enough to 
dissuade Smith from clinging to the belief that quantity of labour embodied remained the key 
factor in explaining relative commodity values (p.404): 
       Book I, chapter 6, of WN, to which we are commonly referred for evidence of 
[Smith's confinement of the labor theory of exchangeable value] to an "early and 
rude state of society," offers no supporting evidence at all [that that was Smith's 
intention]. Smith recognized that the payment of profit and rent must result in an 
inequality between labor commanded and labor embodied, but that carries no 
implications whatever for the continuing validity, or otherwise, of the labor theory. 
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The question is therefore - how is Smith supposed to have "neutralised" the profit and rent 
components of cost so as to to be able to retain at least a version of the labour theory of relative 
values? Peach explains the situation (p.389): 
The question of the continued relevance (or otherwise) of the [labour theory of value] 
. . . depends on the proportion that the rent-plus-profit components of price bear to the 
wage components. If, at one extreme, the proportion is the same for all commodities, 
they would exchange in proportion to the relative quantities of direct and indirect 
labour expended on their production, as reflected in their relative wage components. 
If, at the other extreme, there is not even an approximate uniformity between the 
rent-plus-profit components, the labour theory would be comprehensively 
undermined. 
Peach attributes to Smith – supposedly sympathetic to the labor-embodied theory - a twofold 
solution to this potential problem. 
(1) As regards rents, Peach argues that Smith more or less "gets rid of rent" by supposing that the 
more industrialised an economy becomes, the smaller correspondingly becomes the element of 
rent relative to other components of national income. That is to say, as raw produce is to a greater 
and greater extent worked-up in the course of production, the rent proportion of costs becomes 
progressively less significant, possibly even negligible. Thus, according to Peach, Smith – if he 
was inclined towards the labour embodied theory - need not have worried too much about the 
implications of rent with respect to prices. 
(2) With rent thus effectively pushed out of the picture, Peach must demonstrate that Smith, in 
keeping the door open to the labour-embodied theory, had also found a suitable treatment of 
profits.  According therefore to Peach, Smith, while appreciating that the inclusion of a profit 
component means that prices cannot be equal to wage costs, rather than coming down positively 
in favour of the labour theory, took the position that no reason exists to reject the thesis that 
profits can be understood as constituting an equi-proportional mark-up on all labour costs 
incurred in production. If the introduction of a profit element in fact does no more than that, the 
labour-theory approach may be retained beyond the case of the "early and rude" state of society.  
What, we may ask, is the likelihood that profits constitute no more than an equi-proportional 
addition to labour costs (and of Smith supposing that to be the case)? Peach (p.390) observes 
that, with respect to any two commodities, "the extent of divergence between exchange ratios 
[prices] and embodied-labour ratios [wage costs] will depend on the number of backward layers 
of production activity and, particularly, on differences in the number of layers between 
production of the two final products.” The point Peach is making is that any differences between 
industries in the pattern over time of their labour inputs (in other words, in Sraffian terms, their 
“dated-labour” inputs) mean that final prices are differently affected by a given profit mark-up 
on labour inputs. For instance, costs of production of goods requiring the same labour inputs will 
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be higher if a labour input in one industry occurs at an earlier date (stage) in the production 
process than in the other. Any such variations in the timing of labour inputs undermine the labour 
theory of value by altering the impact on price of the profit margin. 
Peach comments that "There is, then, the potential for a ‘considerable modification’ (as Ricardo 
would say) to the labor theory, although it is possible that the modification will be inconsiderable 
if, for instance, [time profiles of labour inputs into production] do not differ greatly between 
production processes." But he adds, "There is no evidence of Smith having considered the 
implications of differences in the time profiles of labor inputs for the validity of the labor theory, 
and consistently with this 'oversight' his grasp of the 'problem' was patently incomplete." That is 
to say, according to Peach, it was because of an "oversight" that Smith stuck by the labour theory 
beyond the case of the "early and rude state of society": he failed to understand how the 
introduction of a profit mark-up on labour costs could cause fatal difficulty for the labour theory 
of value. Peach's verdict, in other words, is that Smith was prepared to go along with the general 
application of the labour theory to the modern "commercial" economy, because he lacked the 
insight which was to give Ricardo such trouble in attempting to retain that theory. 
Our view, however, is that Peach has seriously underrated Smith's understanding of how prices 
may be affected by a profit mark-up on labour costs. We suggest that there exists clear evidence 
that Smith did appreciate the "time dimension" of the impact of profit on prices, and as well knew 
the time profile of labour inputs to be very different across different lines of production. 
To demonstrate how the cost (price) of commodities produced depends not only on the quantities 
of labour used in production and on the profit mark-up, but also on the specific dates at which 
these inputs were applied in production, Smith (I, vi, 14) introduced an example from linen 
manufacture which involves, in successive stages, the work of flex-dressers, spinners and 
weavers. He explains how, stage-by-stage over time, the profit mark-up on the cost of any given 
quantity of labour, applied at a specific point in time, would (at a compound rate) rise over the 
course of production.  
. . .  if the profits of all the different employers of these working people should be 
raised by five per cent., that part of the price of the commodity which resolved itself 
into profit, would, through all the different stages of the manufacture, rise in 
geometrical proportion to this rise of profit. The employer of the flax-dressers would 
in selling his flax require an additional five per cent. upon the whole value of the 
materials and wages which he advanced to his workmen. The employer of the 
spinners would require an additional five per cent. both upon the advanced price of 
the flax and upon the wages of the spinners.  And the employer of the weavers 
would require a like five per cent. upon the advanced price of the linen yarn and 
upon the wages of the weavers. In raising the price of commodities . . . the rise of 
profit operates like compound interest. 
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The implication is that: 
       In the progress of the manufacture, not only the number of the profits increase, but 
every subsequent profit is greater than the foregoing: because the capital from which 
it is derived must always be greater. The capital which employs the weavers, for 
example, must be greater than that which employs the spinners; because it not only 
replaces that capital with its profits, but pays, besides, the wages of the weavers; and 
the profits must always bear some proportion to the capital.  
Thus Smith is absolutely clear not only that profits separate costs and prices from wage costs, but 
that the divergence of prices from wage costs increases progressively as the lapse of time from 
employment of labour to completion of the product increases. 
Peach, as noted above, remarked that if time profiles of labour inputs into production do not differ 
greatly from one industry to another then it is possible that the divergence of price from wage 
costs on account of the inclusion of a profit element will not "differ greatly between production 
processes" or industries. (p.390) But Smith's observations (quoted below) on the differences 
between industrial production processes should disabuse us of any notion that Smith could have 
supposed the pattern of labour inputs to be much the same between industries. In order to support 
labour in some lines of production, much more labour must be employed, directly and indirectly, 
than in others. Smith in fact points out just how varied are the production processes of different 
industries (II, i, 8-9): 
Some part of the capital of every master artificer or manufacturer must be fixed in the 
instruments of his trade. This part, however, is very small in some, and very great in 
others. A master taylor requires no other instruments of trade but a parcel of needles. 
Those of the master shoemaker are a little, though but a very little, more expensive. 
Those of the weaver rise a good deal above those of the shoemaker. . . .  In other 
words a much greater fixed capital is required. In a great iron-work, for example, the 
furnace for melting the ore, the forge, the slitt-mill are instruments of trade which 
cannot be erected without a very great expense. In coal-works and mines of every 
kind, the machinery necessary both for drawing out the water and for other purposes, 
is frequently still more expensive. 
We may take Smith's description of the different proportions in which industries use fixed relative 
to working capital as a clear indication that he understood the time patterns of application of 
labour inputs to vary significantly between industries (and, as we have seen from the linen 
manufacturing example, he understood also how the size of the profit mark-up depended on the 
date of application of labour). Fixed capital consists of durable items - buildings and equipment - 
which are the products of labour indirectly applied to contribute to production far into the future, 
while circulating capital is the relatively perishable product (wage-goods or materials) of recent 
labour. As the terminology suggests, labour embodied in fixed capital is invested for a longer 
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time, and longer before investment of labour in accompanying circulating capital. The mark-up 
for profit on cost of labour embodied in long-lasting capital goods must far exceed that on 
circulating capital. Smith's recognition of the differing conditions of production across industries 
implies an understanding that the relative prices of final goods would, ceteris paribus, be 
different in an economy in which all output goes to labour from one - otherwise identical - in 
which the same output is distributed to wages and profits. In the latter case not only will 
commodity prices not be equal to labour embodied, the possibility that they are proportionate to 
labour costs is effectively ruled out by the dissimilarity of production conditions across 
industries. 
It is, we suggest, quite improbable, in view of his awareness of these facts as he describes them, 
that Smith could ever (as a thought experiment) have imagined that introducing a profit margin on 
capital invested would have no significant effect on the relative commodity values of industrial 
products. Consequently, we reject Peach's interpretation (p.392) that, 
       the Wealth of Nations contains no evidence, explicit or otherwise, that Smith 
confined the labor theory to the “early and rude state." There is no direct and 
compelling evidence that he regarded anything other than rent as a serious obstacle 
to the labor theory of “static” exchangeable values: an obstacle that he minimized by 
turning into an approximation for “the greater part” of manufactured and mined 
commodities. 
We on the contrary believe that Smith's own observations concerning the character of the 
industrial system and the impact of profits on prices, actually constitute “direct and compelling 
evidence” that he could not have accepted the "proportionality" version of the labour-embodied 
theory of relative commodity values. We find no reason to doubt that Smith, as he is generally 
believed to have done, did limit the applicability of the labour theory to the notional case of an 
"early and rude state of society, not intending the labour-embodied explanation of relative values 
to extend to the conditions of a “commercial society”. 
3. Labour-commanded (supposedly) transformed into labour-embodied 
The above (unconvincing) “proportionality” argument is only a first stage in Peach’s attempt to 
attribute to Adam Smith a commitment to the labour-embodied explanation of relative values. 
The second part of his argument (with which we now deal) reveals, we believe, the reason behind 
Peach’s “reappraisal” of Smiths’s theory of value. We suggest that a misunderstanding on Peach's 
part of the implications of the labour-commanded approach is responsible for Peach’s attempt to 
“reappraise” – in fact, propose a revolutionary transformation of – Smith’s theory of value.  On 
the subject of labour commanded let us go back to the beginning. 
As regards the “real price of commodities” Adam Smith declares (I,v. 2) that “Labour was the 
first price, the original purchase money that was paid for all things.” Again, he states, (i, v, 1), “A 
man must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can command, or 
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afford to purchase.” From Smith’s perspective, labour is the ultimate source of all wealth. The 
real value of any commodity one may possess therefore corresponds to the amount of labour 
(source of wealth) which it can purchase or command; the real cost of any commodity is the 
amount of labour (source of wealth) which must be given up to acquire it, either through 
production or through exchange. 
In the “early and rude state” of society where labour captures as income all output produced (no 
rents or profits involved) the value of labour “embodied” in production determines both the cost 
of production and to the price of a commodity. To employ Peach’s terminology, the “labour of 
acquiring through production (LA1)” is the same as the “labour of acquiring through purchase 
(LA2).”  
In a society more advanced than that of the “early and rude state”, capitalists and landowners 
share output with the workers. Prices can then no longer correspond to labour embodied, but must 
exceed the wage bill by allowances for profits and rents. Relative commodity values, while no 
longer equal to labour embodied, may instead be interpreted and measured in terms of labour 
commanded. That we understand to be the procedure adopted by Adam Smith. The quantity of 
“labour commanded” denotes price in terms of the quantity of labour for which a commodity may 
be purchased - either by the “toil and trouble” of actual effort in production, or via exchange of 
equal values on the market. Even when goods exchange at prices corresponding not to quantities 
of labour-embodied, but to quantities of labour-commanded, the labour of acquiring through 
production (LA1) and the labour of acquiring through exchange (LA2) remain equal: whichever 
is the method of acquisition, the real cost (measured in labour expended) remains the same.   
To illustrate: situation (a), the “early and rude” state of society. Suppose that 40 units of labour 
(40N) go into the production of 20 units of commodity X; if wages are £5 per unit of labour and 
no output is distributed to profits or rents, the price of 20X will be £200, and the price per unit of 
X, £10. 
Labour-embodied per unit of X is 2N and price of one unit of X (corresponding to 2N) is £20. 
Labour-commanded per unit of X is 2N. [One unit of X (costing £10) exchanges for/buys 2 units 
of labour costing (£5 per unit)]. Using Peach’s LA (labour of acquiring) measure, LA1 (labour of 
acquiring through production: one unit labour (work) earns £5, which buys 1/2X; therefore two 
units of labour (earning £10) are required to purchase one unit of X.  LA2 (labour of acquiring 
through exchange: one unit of labour (by spending £5 in the market) likewise buys 1/2X; two 
therefore two labour exchange for one X. In these circumstances labour-embodied (LE) equals 
labour-commanded (LC) equals 2N, and labour of acquiring through production (LA1) equals 
labour of acquiring through exchange (LA2) = 2N.  
Situation (b): the “commercial” society. We suppose again that 40 units of labour go to the 
production of 20 units of commodity X. Again wages are £5 per unit of labour. This time, 
however, capitalists take a share of output in the form of profits. Suppose profits are 20% on 
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capital advanced in support of labour (wage-goods). The price of 20X is now £240, and the price 
of one unit of X, £12. 
The quantity of labour embodied per unit of X is, as before, 2N, but the price of one unit of X is 
now £12 – equal to the wages of 2.4 units of labour. Labour-commanded per unit of X is 
correspondingly ligher: one unit of X commands 2.4 labour [On the market one unit of X (costing 
£12) exchanges for 2.4 units of labour (costing £5 per unit).] In terms of Peach’s labour of 
acquiring measure (not as Peach, but as we read it), LA1 has risen to 2.4: the real reward of labour 
is less than before, as more hours have to be worked to acquire the same quantity of goods. (What 
labour acquires through engagement in production depends on the rate of wages relative to the 
price of output.) LA2 (labour of acquiring through exchange) is also, again for the reason that the 
price of X has risen relatively to the wage of labour, higher at 2.4 labour. Thus, labour embodied 
in one X (still 2 labour) is less than labour commanded (now 2.4 labour); LA1 and LA2 remain 
equal (by either means of acquision, X now costs more in terms of labour.) 
We have no doubt that the above is a correct description of the relationships among labour 
embodied, labour commanded and labour of acquiring. That is not however how Peach 
understands these relationships. We reckon his interpretation is mistaken. It would appear that he 
misunderstands the implications of the introduction of a profit margin. Peach - incorrectly - thinks 
that Smith is similarly confused; in consequence Peach devotes much of his paper to constructing 
and attributing to Smith an entirely imaginary strategy intended to enable escape from the 
consequences of a supposed mistake. The upshot is that we are asked by Peach to believe that, in 
employing that strategy, Smith deliberately turned himself into a proponent of the labour theory 
of exchange value.  
What, then, is Peach’s mistake? Peach takes the incorrect view that in the commercial society 
when prices are not equal to labour-embodied, LA1 and LA2 are not the same – indicating that the 
labour cost of acquiring by production is no longer the same as the labour cost of acquiring by 
exchange. Thus Peach (pp.394ff): 
It is only in the “early and rude state” that the “toil and trouble of acquiring” a 
commodity in the sense of producing that commodity is equal to the labor 
commanded by that commodity. But the labor commanded by a commodity can also 
be interpreted as the “toil and trouble of acquiring” through purchase or exchange. It 
is in the “early and rude state”, and this state alone, that the “labor of acquiring” 
through production (LA1) is equal to the “labor of acquiring” through purchase 
(LA2); if I wish to acquire (purchase) a commodity that has been acquired 
(produced) by ten days of labor, I must either exchange a commodity that I have 
produced in ten days, offer ten days of labor, or give the sum of money that I have 
previously received either for my commodity or my direct labor services. . . .  
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Once we depart from the “early and rude state”, the equivalence between LA1 and 
LA2, disappears along with the equality between labor embodied and labor 
commanded (the two pairings are different sides of the same coin). 
On departing from the “early and rude state, we, on the contrary, as explained above, reckon the 
“labour of acquiring”– both through production (LA1) and through exchange (LA2) to be (in the 
terms of our example) exactly the same, at 2.4. But Peach takes LA1 (via production) to remain 
unchanged (at 2 units), while allowing that LA2 (via exchange) does increase to 2.4. As we read 
him, Peach is confusing the physical cost, in labour, of actually producing X, (which has not 
changed between the “early and rude state” and the “commercial state”) with the amount of 
labour for which X exchanges (against the now higher price of X) in the market. The quantity of 
output produced by labour (technologically determined) is, in the commercial society, no longer 
the same as the quantity of output with which labour is rewarded (socially determined). 
To elaborate: what Peach fails to take into account is that while (in our model) two units of labour 
enter - in both situations - into the production of one unit of X, what labour “acquires” in the 
“commercial state” from the expenditure of that effort is not the whole output of the labour 
applied, but only what is left to the worker after the claims of capitalist (and landowner) have 
been met. In our example, two workers (paid £10) produce one unit of X (market value £12); but 
these two workers cannot buy with their wages the one unit of X on the production of which their 
efforts have been spent – they can (together) afford only 10/12 (83.3%) of a unit of X. The cost of 
acquiring one unit of X via labour expended in production is then not two units of labour, but 
more, in fact (12/10 x 2) = 2.4 units of labour. The values of LA1 and LA2 are, pace Peach, equal. 
How, we may ask, has Peach come to make this error of supposing LA1 and LA2 to be unequal in 
the case of the “commercial” economy? Peach seems to imagine that the cost in labour of 
acquiring a commodity through production is determined by technological factors but unaffected 
by institutional conditions so that, in our illustrative example, if technology is unchanged between 
the early and rude and commercial states, the value of LA1 (labour of acquisition via production) 
is the same, irrespective of whether all output goes to labour or is divided amongst wages, profits 
and rents. But (as demonstrated above) that cannot be so: while the output produced by labour 
may be the same under different social conditions, payment for the “toil and trouble” involved is 
not: in the “commercial society”, same real cost in effort brings the worker a smaller real reward 
in produce than in the “early and rude state” (more real effort is required to purchase the same real 
reward). It is the relationship between capital and labour through conditions of employment in the 
industrial sphere that determines the share of output the worker takes home; in other words, with 
the price of output (X) in terms of labour, LA1, thus determined, workers enter the market with a 
certain purchasing power, corresponding to the quantity of X with which their labour has been 
rewarded; thus the value of LA2 is given by the value of LA1 
But Peach seems to think that the value of LA2 is independent of the value of LA1 (with the latter 
presumably taken to be fixed according to the technological conditions common to both the 
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“early and rude state” and the “commercial society”. Having remarked that “Once we depart from 
the ‘early and rude state,’ the equivalence between LA1 and LA2 disappears” Peach goes on to 
say, “whether [goods] are ‘cheap’ or ‘dear’, whether their real price is low or high, now depends 
entirely on LA2; on the length of sacrifice of ‘ease, liberty and happiness’ that laborers (and they 
alone) must endure to earn sufficient wages to enable them to ‘acquire’ in the sense of purchase of 
commodities.” (Emphasis added) 
When Peach says all “depends on LA2” he is surely describing the implications of LA1 – the 
terms on which, in the context of production, labour is able to capture a share of output? Peach is 
of course correct in stating that the “real price of labour” corresponds to workers’ ability to 
“’acquire’ in the sense of purchase commodities” – but, as we understand the situation – workers’ 
ability to purchase commodities derives from their ability to capture a share of the output they 
produce; that ability is determined by the relationship of employers and employees in the labour 
and the relevance of buffer stock management  combined with the creation of a new reserve market, 
and is reflected in the value of LA1. If Peach had admitted that to be the case, then he would have 
accepted that, in the “commercial society” the values of both LA1 and LA2 are affected by the 
difference in distribution between the “early and rude” and “commercial” states of society; in the 
latter situation, the terms on which labour can acquire goods – via trade and via direct effort – 
have turned against labour, because of the appearance on the scene of capitalist employers. 
Peach’s differentiation of LA1 from LA2 in fact appears to be redundant. 
This mistake on the part of Peach – to suppose that LA1 is not the same as LA2 in the general case 
of the “commercial” economy - is the key to his “Reconsideration” of Adam Smith’s theory of 
real value. It is on account of this misunderstanding that Peach takes it upon himself to rewrite 
Smith’s theory so as to deal with what he perceives as an anomaly – the supposed inequality of 
LA1 and LA2 in the case of the “commercial” economy. Perceiving this inconsistency, Peach has 
doubts about the propriety of using the labour-commanded measure, and suspects that Smith 
likewise became uncomfortable about using it. Peach observes (p.396): 
Labour commanded now presents itself as a measure of real price or real value 
interpreted either in the second sense of labor of acquiring (of purchasing by 
laborers) or a command over living wage-labor. But, it has also become ill-suited to 
the task of equating real price to the first concept of labor of acquiring: the labor 
expended on a commodity’s production.1 
Peach, believing that Smith was accordingly unhappy with the labour-commanded measure of 
value, and wondering why Smith bothered at all to measure real values in terms of labour 
commanded, suggests (p.97) that, in doing so, he may have had an unannounced ulterior motive: 
                                                          
1 “[T]he first concept of labour of acquiring” (LA1): Peach is missing the point as regards whose labour (?)  
acquires what (?) benefit. In the case of the “commercial society”, labour expended on a commodity’s production 
by the workers is not sufficient (given wages) to buy all of that production: the society as a whole buys it and 
benefits, but labour has to share the benefit with capital and land. 
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Whatever the point . . .of measuring the (changing) real prices of individual 
commodities in the advanced commercial society – something which was 
categorically part of Smith’s agenda – one can scarcely imagine that it was 
principally to associate real prices with labor embodied. But that is exactly what he 
attempted to do. 
At this point, given Peach’s contentious interpretation of what Smith was trying to do, we should 
- in order not to lose our bearings - recall how Smith did employ labour-commanded as a measure 
of real value and subsequently introduced “corn-commanded” to supplement the 
labour-commanded measure. Despite Peach’s puzzlement as to the point of measuring real 
commodity prices in the advanced commercial society, Smith explains (in a passage in fact 
quoted by Peach!) precisely why it may be of interest to measure and compare real values. 
In such a work as this . . . it may sometimes be of use to compare the different 
values of a particular commodity at different times and places, or the different 
degrees of power over the labour of other people which it may, upon different 
occasions, have given to those who possessed it. (I, v, 22) 
Smith notes that it can be of practical importance to know real values change over time. He 
explains that it may make a significant difference to the meaning of a long-lasting contract 
whether an obligation is specified in real or nominal terms. The labour-commanded measure 
makes possible comparisons of real values over time. He goes on to make the point that if we wish 
to estimate how real values have altered over a long period of time, it may not always be 
practicable to make direct use of the labour-commanded measure – the problem being that the 
price of labour at distant dates (as required for comparison with contemporaneous commodity 
prices) is not always knowable. However, he suggests a way round the problem. 
This is where Smith’s alternative “corn-commanded” measure comes into the picture. Smith’s 
proposal is to use the well-documented price of corn as a proxy for the price of labour, a proposal 
justified by the fact (as Smith understands it to be) that over the long run the price of corn (the 
main element in the subsistence of labour) has moved similarly to the price of labour. Thus Smith 
(I, v, 15): “Equal quantities of labour will, at distant times, be purchased more nearly with equal 
quantities of corn, the subsistence of the labourer, than with equal quantities of gold and silver, or 
perhaps of any other commodity.”  
The convenient implication of this virtually constant price relationship for Smith is that, with 
regard to understanding past conditions, with the price of labour lost in the mists of time, the price 
of corn may be taken as a proxy for the missing price of labour. That is to say, changes in the real 
value of other commodities may be measued in terms of the quantity of corn commanded, when it 
is impossible, for want of data on wages, to do so directly by reference to the quantity of labour 
commanded. Thus Smith (I, xi, e): “. . . we can better judge of the real value of silver, by 
comparing it with corn, than by comparing it with any other commodity, or sett of commodities.” 
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We may illustrate Smith’s use of corn-commanded as a proxy for labour-commanded.  He shows 
(I, xi, o, 9) how, over three centuries, the real value (cost) of “the finest cloth” has been 
dramatically reduced. The price per yard in the year 1487 is put at sixteen shillings and its late 
eighteenth century equivalent at a guinea; but the real cost of cloth, measured in terms of wheat 
(as a proxy for its labour-commanded cost) Smith reports as having fallen from “two quarters and 
more than three bushels of wheat” to a mere fraction of its earlier price – three quarters of a 
bushel. 
Smith’s use in that way of the corn measure seems to us entirely straightforward, but Peach will 
not have it so. He proposes another reason for Smith’s switching from labour-commanded to 
corn-commanded. As mentioned, Peach holds that Smith was not reconciled to using his own 
labour-commanded measure of real value: instead - as Peach interprets his thinking – he 
continued to hanker after the labour-embodied criterion. Thus, having already attempted to blur 
the distinction between labour commanded and labour embodied (as we describe below), Smith, 
Peach alleges (p.399), goes further along that road by transforming the proxy corn-commanded 
measure of value into an alternative labour-embodied standard of value. 
To obtain a more robust association between real price/value and labour embodied it 
would be necessary to make further, more restrictive assumptions. And that is what 
Smith did. Hence his switch . . . from labor commanded to corn commanded as the 
real measure, and, more pertinently, his assumption . . . that corn is produced with 
nearly equal quantities of labor.  
According to Peach, Smith progresses from labour embodied to labour commanded, and then 
from corn-commanded to labour embodied – by way of the fact that corn-commanded is supposed 
to correspond to a nearly constant quantity of labour embodied. Peach jumps on Smith’s 
assumption that, over the long term, “corn is produced with nearly equal quantities of labour”: 
here, he thinks is the all-significant give-away that Smith had come to maintain that real value 
consisted in labour embodied, not in labour commanded. Peach’s contention is that, in supposing 
the labour input into corn production to be effectively constant, Smith, for the purpose of making 
comparisons of value, was in fact deliberately replacing the labour-commanded standard (or its 
proxy, the corn-commanded standard), by the quantity of labour embodied in corn as a measure of 
real cost.  From that perspective, the real cost or value of a commodity is not given by the amount 
of labour which has to be paid for its acquisition, but by (something quite different) the quantity 
of labour embodied in the commodity. Using the procedure Peach attributes to Smith for the 
purpose of estimating changes in real value over time, changes in the price of a particular 
commodity would be compared with the price of the constant quantity of labour embodied in 
corn, thereby revealing in terms of labour-embodied - rather than in terms of labour-commanded 
– changes in the real value of the commodity in question.  
Peach is categorical that Smith was intentionally going back to the labour-embodied theory of 
real value. Peach argues that, if for the purpose of using corn-embodied simply as a proxy for 
14 
 
labour-commanded Smith had no reason to emphasise that corn was produced over time using 
“nearly equal quantities of labour”; Smith, he believes, must have had a particular motive in doing 
so. The following is his interpretation (p.401) of what Smith was doing: 
The significance of the supererogatory assumption of nearly constant quantities of 
labor in the production of corn is that it signals the transition from the use of corn as 
a proxy for labor commanded alone to its additional use and, in a remarkable twist, 
its principal use – as a measure of labor embodied. Smith had transformed his real 
measure into a Ricardo-type construct, defined by a (nearly) constant quantity of 
labor expended on its production, which could be used to identify changes in the 
real prices or real values of other commodities (particularly silver) with changes in 
the quantity of labor expended on their production. 
What, according to Peach (p.401), Smith gains by this transformation of his “real measure” is 
correction of the supposed anomaly of the inequality of LA1 and LA2 when labour-embodied 
values do not obtain. 
The two notions of labor embodied and labor commanded were thereby conflated 
or, put another way, Smith had stipulated the conditions which might allow him to 
re-capture the double meaning of real price as a reference to both concepts of 
“difficulty of acquiring”, as was the case in the “early and rude state.” 
Now, claims Peach, with the use Smith made of the nearly constant labour cost of corn, the 
situation has been corrected: LA2 has been brought into alignment with LA1 beyond the “early 
and rude state.” So, according to to Peach, in this complicated way, Smith reached a position in 
which he was able to say, that, under all circumstances, the real costs in labour of acquiring a 
commodity are the same, whether of acquiring that commodity through actual production, or of 
acquiring it via exchange on the market. And those real costs of acquisition correspond to the 
quantity of labour embodied in the commodity. 
We reckon that, in seeking to equate LA1 and LA2, and believing the value of LA1 to correspond 
to the quantity of labour required for production as given by technology, irrespective of social 
conditions, Peach understood that it had to be demonstrated in the case of the “commercial” 
economy that the value of LA2 conformed to that of LA1. Properly, however, for consistency with 
Smith’s theory, the opposite was necessary - it needed to be shown that LA1 took the same 
labour-commanded value as Smith would have attributed to LA2. 
Peach sums up on what he believes Smith had done (p.404): 
Smith had moved beyond the conflation of (changes in) labour embodied and labour 
commanded, achieved . . .  by the specification of a nearly constant labor input to the 
corn commanded standard, to a complete switch in the real measure away from corn 
commanded or labour commanded to labour embodied alone. Ultimately, the very 
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meaning of real value or real price was identified with embodied labour – with the 
labour of acquiring through production – in disregard for the labour commanded 
measure of real price or its corn commanded “proxy”. But why was he led to 
introduce such a blatant inconsistency into his theoretical system? The answer, I 
suggest, is to be found in the importance he attached to labor embodied as the source 
and determinant of changes - in all stages of society. 
To continue with Peach’s summing-up: Peach alleges (p.405), that Smith (who normally took 
the greatest pains to make his meaning clear to readers) decided for some reason not to advertise 
his commitment to the labour-embodied theory.   
Smith did not boldly announce his continuing use and attachment to the labor theory 
but, then again, neither did he explicitly announce his adherence to any other theory 
of exchangeable value. However, the lengths to which he went to associate (changes 
in) “real price/real value” with (changes in) labor embodied, ultimately at the cost of 
abandoning his own declared choice of “real measure”, is evidence of the importance 
he attached to expended labor as the underlying determinant of exchangeable value. 
Where exactly does all this leave us? It remains – at least to the present reader – unclear how 
Peach reconciles – if indeed he does - Smith’s acceptance of the inequality of commodity prices 
with labour costs in the “commercial” society with his reconciliation of LA1 and LA2 on the 
basis of both measures corresponding to a quantity of labour embodied (as in the “early and rude 
state”). There would be no problem if that reconciliation as based on the fact that both LA1 and 
LA2 correspond to labour-commanded – but that is clearly not Peach’s meaning. Are we to take 
it then that this indicates an inconsistency in Smith’s (reconstructed) theoretical scheme? 
Perhaps that is what Peach is getting at when, referring (p.384) to Smith’s direct identification of 
real value and real price with quantities of expended labor, he comments, “That identification, is 
evidence of an inconsistency in his theoretical approach, but alongside Smith’s other attempts to 
maintain a link between real price/real value and expended labour it also testifies to the 
significance of the labor theory in his work.” 
In short, Peach holds that Smith surreptitiously abandoned labour-commanded as the measure of 
value appropriate to the modern “commercial” society and attempted to extend the 
labour-embodied measure to a world in which profits and rents share the value of output with 
wages. We are not persuaded that Smith actually did make such an attempt. It is difficult to 
believe that Smith could have imagined the labour-embodied theory to be of general 
applicability. As we have already observed, when profits and rents cause a divergence between 
costs of labour (direct and indirect) and the (equilibrium) prices of commodities, it is only on the 
implausible condition that commodity values are proportionate to labour embodied, that (a 
version) of the labor-embodied theory can be retained. We cannot agree with Peach that Smith 
may have thought that to be the typical state of affairs. Nor, alternatively, are we convinced that, 
as Peach seems to imply, with the supposed conflation of LA1 and LA2, Smith eventually, and 
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inconsistently with adherence to the “proportionate” version of the labour theory, took relative 
values as being equal to labour embodied. 
4. Smith's (alleged) use of the labour-embodied theory of value 
The third element of Peach’s “reconsideration” of Smith’s theory of value consists of a number of 
demonstrations intended to show that Smith did in fact employ the labour-embodied theory of 
value.  
Consider instances highlighted by Peach: first, on the subject of silver mining (p.397). There can 
be no doubt that on this matter, Smith, initially, was thinking in terms of values as corresponding 
to labour-commanded, not labour-embodied. Smith explains that “as it cost less labour to bring 
these metals from the mine to the market, so when they were brought thither they could purchase 
or command less labour.” (Emphasis added.)  Peach’s understanding, however, is that Smith 
soon drifted away from the labour-commanded position. In fact Peach makes the point that, on his 
reading, such treatment is the exception on Smith's part: he holds that, generally, "it is [by Smith] 
simply taken for granted that changes and differences in embodied labour are the causes of 
changes and differences in real prices . . . without any explicit mention of labour commanded." 
Attention is drawn also to illustrations concerning the relatively high costs of large fishing vessels 
and the low costs of water transport. Peach complains that Smith appears to attribute such price 
differences solely to differences in labour embodied, ignoring the fact that (in tems of labour 
commanded) prices must necessarily embody an allowance for profit and rent as well as cover 
costs of direct and indirect labour. He comments (p.399): 
From the passages considered above it is evident that Smith was invoking changes 
and differences in embodied labor as the principal determinant of changes and 
differences in money prices and exchangeable value. Equally, if not more 
significant is the procedure he was adopting, by expressing the latter changes and 
differences as the result of changes and differences in real prices/real values as if 
these were a unique function of quantities of embodied labor. 
We think Peach's response unjustified. We do not accept that the instances cited indicate a 
tendency on the part of Smith, whether by carelessness or (or as Peach suspects) by design, to 
slip back to a labour-embodied explanation of prices. The fact is that, even in the case of a 
"commercial society", any increase in necessary labour inputs, direct or indirect, will of course 
increase cost of production and (ceteris paribus) the price of a commodity. We read Smith as 
meaning nothing more than that; it was hardly necessary that he should, with every example, 
have stated explicitly (as he had actually done earlier), that higher employment of labour would 
affect commodity prices not only directly via a larger wage bill, but would imply a further price 
increase as required to allow for profit on the increased capital invested. That could surely be 
read as understood. 
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But we are not yet at the end of Peach’s re-interpretation of Smith as expounding a 
labour-embodied explanation of value.  Peach examines at length (pp.402-3) Smith’s analysis 
of situations in which the price in silver of corn differs, at the same time, from one place to 
another. Smith considers two instances: that corn is dearer in large towns than in the countryside, 
and that Polish corn is dearer in Amsterdam than in Danzick (sic). We understand Smith as 
making the simple point that in both instances, where corn is dearer, the explanation is that more 
labour is required to deliver corn to a town, or corn to Amsterdam than to make it available in the 
countryside where it is grown, or in Danzig from whence it is shipped. Smith notes that it cannot 
be that the corn price difference reflects a different real value of silver between the places in 
question: there is no reason for that to be so. As Smith put it (I, xi, e):      
It does not cost less labour to bring silver to Amsterdam than to Dantzick, but it 
costs a great deal more to bring corn. The real cost of silver must be very nearly the 
same in both places; but that of corn must be very different. 
We take Smith’s explanation as straightforward and acceptable – entirely consistent with a 
labour-commanded interpretation of real value. The difference in money values (labour 
commanded) can be due only to the differing real costs of supplying corn to these different 
markets.  
But Peach finds Smith’s account to imply a labour-embodied perspective – incompatible with his 
labour-commanded / corn commanded measure of value. Peach objects : 
But, silver is “really cheaper” (its real price/real value is lower) in “great towns” 
because, on Smith’s own criterion, it commands less corn. . . . Now unwilling to 
follow the logic of his own corn-commanded measure, Smith has identified “real 
dearness” and “real cheapness” not with the results of his “measure”, which gave the 
“wrong” result, but directly with the quantities of labour expended in production. 
Peach adds that this (mistake, he alleges) was not “a mere slip” of Smith’s pen, as is indicated by 
the fact that he makes the same “mistake” in both his town/country and Amsterdam/Danzig 
examples. That is to say, Peach reads Smith as abandoning his corn-commanded explanation of 
values - which indicates that silver is cheap in terms of corn - and asserting a labour-embodied 
embodied explanation to the effect that it is the high price of corn that needs to be explained, and 
that the relevant explanation lies in the greater labour input required to provide corn to 
Amsterdam and to large towns. 
Our response is that it is Peach, not Smith, who is guilty of confused thinking. In this case, 
labour-commanded (which is what we believe Smith uses), not corn-commanded (as employed 
by Peach), is the appropriate measure of real value. For one thing, there is no need to resort to the 
alternative corn-commanded measure - the relevant prices of labour are known; secondly, it is 
inappropriate to use corn-commanded as a proxy for labour commanded when what is at issue is 
the variation of the price of corn relative to a constant price of labour. Furthermore, we find that 
18 
 
Peach again commits the fundamental error of supposing that when Smith explains that the cost of 
a commodity has increased because of the application of a greater quantity of labour to its 
production, he must be thinking in terms of the labour-embodied theory of value. To repeat, there 
is no need to suppose that to be so. As mentioned above, while an increase in direct and/or indirect 
labour inputs would certainly, in the “early and rude” state of society raise the price of a 
commodity in direct proportion to the increase in labour embodied, under modern conditions, the 
increased input of labour would have not only a direct impact on costs and price, but in addition 
would induce a further increase in price in order to maintain the mark-up for profit at the going 
rate. There is no justification for saying that Smith is abandoning the labour-commanded measure 
of value in favour of labour-embodied. 
Regarding yet another contemporary phenomenon, Peach similarly (p.403-4) takes issue with 
Smith, this time over meaning of the “high price of corn” as experienced in Britain in the latter 
part of the eighteenth century. Smith observes (I, xi, g): 
 The high price of corn during these ten or twelve years past, indeed, has occasioned 
a suspicion that the real value of silver still continues to fall in the European market. 
This high price of corn, however, seems evidently to have been the effect of the 
extraordinary unfavourable circumstances of the seasons, and ought therefore to be 
regarded, not as a permanent, but as a transitory and occasional event. 
Peach disagrees : 
Yet, the real value of silver had continued to fall in the sense that it commanded less 
corn. He [Smith] was again falling back upon a direct identification of silver’s real 
value with the quantity of labour expended on its production. 
And again we ask, why should Peace take exception to Smith’s interpretation? By the 
labour-commanded measure the real cost (in labour) of corn has been high over these years, 
because of a succession of bad harvests. In the circumstances it is inappropriate for Peach to adopt 
a corn-commanded perspective, and wrong to conclude that, with corn being dear in terms of 
silver, Smith was adopting a labour-embodied explanation of the price of silver. 
A final example over which Peach (pp.403-4) is critical of Smith relates to the “real recompense” 
of labour. Again it seems to us that what Smith says makes sense and that Peach is confused. 
Peach quotes Smith (I, xi, g): 
In Great Britain the real recompense of labour . . . the real quantities of the 
necessaries and conveniences of life which are given to the labourer, have increased 
considerably during the course of the present century. The rise in . . . money price 
seems to have been the effect, not of any diminution in the value of silver . . . but of 
a rise in the real price of labour. 
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 Yet again, Peach objects: 
It is almost as if Smith had forgotten, or did not wish to remind himself, that labour 
commanded was his own choice of real measure. If the real and nominal price of 
labour has “increased considerably”, then corn-commanded would fail in its role as 
a proxy and (logically) the only correct inference is that there has been a “diminution 
in the (real) value of silver” (it commands less labour). Again, Smith was refusing to 
accept the logic of his own position, this time in direct and explicit contradiction to 
his “primary” conception of real value as labour-commanded. 
 Peach revealingly comments (p.403): 
      In these circumstances, however, it would have been theoretically justifiable and 
practicable (since the recent data were known) to have reverted to the labor 
commanded form of the standard. But that would not have helped the labour theory 
cause. (Emphasis added.) 
As we read Smith, he is observing that the real value of wages has increased over the current 
century and so also has the money wage.  He makes the point that this increase in the money 
price of labour should not be put down to a general rise in money values: it is in fact an increase in 
the “real recompense” of labour. Referring to the rise in the money price of labour Smith explains 
that as corresponding to an increase in real earnings, not the effect of a general rise in silver 
prices. Smith is not intending to deny that wages now buy more silver; at the same time – a fact 
which Peach seems to overlook – silver is no cheaper with respect to anything else; there has not 
been a general “diminution in the value of silver”. We think Peach has got it wrong in alleging 
that Smith was “refusing to accept the logic of his own position . . . in direct and explicit 
contradiction to his primary conception of real value as labour-commanded.” Peach is blinded by 
his misunderstanding that Smith has abandoned labour-commanded for labour-embodied. 
5. Conclusion 
Peach has failed to understand the implications of the labour-commanded measure of value when 
used in the context of an economy in which labour shares output with capitalists and landlords. 
Peach mistakenly supposes that this implies an anomalous situation in which (to employ Peach's 
terminology) “the labour of acquiring goods through exchange (LA1)" exceeds “the labour of 
acquiring goods through production (LA2)". But in reality, no anomaly exists: it is only Peach 
who thinks it does. The real cost to workers is the same whether goods are acquired by direct 
labour or by exchange. Peach seems to interpret Smith as likewise worried by the existence of the 
supposed anomaly and to have struggled to find a way of escaping it. The convoluted analysis he 
attributes to Smith, by which labour-commanded is transformed into labour-embodied as the 
chosen standard of value, represents Peach's attempt to explain how Smith solved a non-existent 
problem – that of achieving a reconciliation of LA1 and LA2 in the general case of the 
“commercial” economy. Peach’s “Reconsideration,” or rather reconstruction, of Smith’s analysis 
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is not required. But it is not clear how Smith is supposed, on Peach’s reading, to square a leaning 
towards a “proportional” interpretation of the labour theory with his supposed reconciliation of 
the two meanings of Peach’s “labour of acquiring” measure as signifying labour-embodied. 
Terry Peach represents Adam Smith’s treatment of value as confusing and apparently inconsistent 
– and much more complicated than we believe it to be. If that was really the character of Smith’s 
analysis in the Wealth of Nations we doubt if that volume could have enjoyed the respect and 
influence that, over generations, it has received. 
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